Abstract-Five properties of an architecture for secure access to web services are defined and two existing architectures are evaluated according to these criteria. References to these criteria in the literature and evaluation of the security architectures are tabulated in the conclusion. Policy-sufficiency is defined as the requirement that any meaningful statements can be expressed in policy definitions of the architecture. Protocol neutrality is the requirement that a protocol exchange which is logically equivalent to a valid protocol sequence is also valid. Predicateboundedness is the constraint that a fixed, finite set of predicates (or language constructs) will be sufficient for security policy definitions, i.e. the language does not need to be incrementally extended indefinitely. Protocol-closure requires that security protocols can be combined together arbitrarily to make new protocols. Finally, processing complexity constrains algorithms for evaluating security rules to be of satisfactory (low) complexity. No existing security architectures recieve a tick for all five of these criteria. The RW architecture is more successful in this regard than the simpler XACML architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lack of a satisfactory and standardised secure access model may be the critical road-block preventing wider deployment and use of Web services. We need a sufficiently articulated approach to Internet security, so that security can be improved without unnecessarily inhibiting service. The Web Services Security (WSS) proposal [5] , [6] from OASIS [3] directly addresses this need. The key standards which are used in the WSS proposal are XACML [4] , [19] and SAML [18] .
Any attempt to propose an architecture for managing access restrictions and control will inevitably beg the question -why is this architecture better than any other? In this paper we formulate conditions which we believe are highly desirable for any architecture for managing access to services over the Internet and discuss these criteria in the context of the WSS architecture.
Before this we need to define the phrase protocol architecture for secure access to network services -in brief, security architecture. By this we mean the protocols, definitions, and techniques (including algorithms) which are used to ensure that all the parties involved in exchanges of information and services on the Internet are satisfied, as regards security issues, i.e. privacy, authenticity, accuracy, and access to services, to the extent and only the extent that the parties require such security properties. In order to not unnecessarily restrict interaction, security architectures should both ensure the security requirements of the participating parties while allowing those parties to make their own particular compromises. In this paper we focus in particular on access control.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the main proposals used for defining secure access to R. G. Addie is with the University of Southern Queensland Alan Colman is with Swinburne University of Technology Web resources and evaluates the expressive power of these standards and proposals. Two web-services security architectures are distinguished for the purpose of subsequent evaluation and comparison. Section 3 provides a motivating scenario that illustrates the need for flexible access protocols, and shows how security assertions might be expressed as predicates in order that they might be logically manipulated. Sections 4 to 7 describe the desirable criteria that are introduced and used for evaluating security architectures, and descrbes the extent to which the two security architectures meet these criteria. Section 8 summaries our conclusions regarding the evaluation of the five criteria, presenting the evalution of the two architectures, together with references which implicitly reference the criteria, in a table.
II. BACKGROUND -SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR WEB SERVICES
The security architecture we wish to consider is concerned with every aspect of access, as provided by the Web services under consideration. Some services might provide only limited control, while others highly articulated control which depends on details of the request, the requester, and the current status of the service provider.
A. XACML-based Security Architecture
Although standardisation of security architecture for Web services is already the subject of many reports, papers, and is treated in books [15] , [16] , [6] , [13] , it is fair to say that it is at an early stage and views differ about how it might be achieved. The industry parties to the standardisation process appear to be forming two or more separate alliances which have similar aims, but somewhat less similar ideas about how they should be achieved.
There appears to be widespread agreement that a key issue, which is of great concern to the Web services industry and its clients, is the need for Web services to be able to manage the identity indicators associated with Web service requests and responses. For example, individual Web servers use cookies to manage the identity associated with a series of interractions. However, the mechanisms for maintaining the information which links a client with their requests becomes more complex when the request involves multiple subsidiary Web-service requests.
The security architecture supporting these developments will be referred to as XACML-based security architecture. Although many details of this architecture remain to be decided, its features are sufficiently clear that we can apply the criteria of interest in this paper and use these to contrast it with the other architecture, which will be introduced in the next subsection.
In this paper, rather than emphasising the management of the identities associated with requests and responses we assume that validating identity associations has already been achieved. Tracking and validating identities of the parties in a transaction is of critical importance and requires both theoretical (e.g. [11] ) and practical [6] , [13] treatment for successful identity management to be available for Web services. In a sense, therefore, the work here is complementary to that in [6] , [13] .
B. An Alternative Security Architecture A more ambitious view of web-services security architecture is presented in [8] , [20] , [14] , [21] . In this architecture a language other than XACML is introduced and this language (RW) is used to express policies. Although a translation of RW into XACML is included there are certain features which allow RW to be more expressive than XACML. Also, in [8] , [14] protocol validity criteria are introduced -to the effect that it is not possible for a coalition of users to achieve inappropriate access to resources by a sequence of steps -with the intention that formal methods are then used to prove that these validity criteria are met whenever other less expressive criteria are met. That is to say, these validity criteria do need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. This separation of criteria into those that are evaluated, dynamically, case-by-case, and those that are not evaluated dynamically but instead are formally proved to hold by analysing the dynamically required criteria, enables this architecture to be more expressive than one which is based solely on XACML.
We therefore evaluate this as the second security architecture here. This will be referred to as RW-based security architecture. It should be noted the authors of [8] , [20] , [14] , [21] have not proposed their work as an alternative security architecture, however when we evaluate their work according to the criteria investigated in this paper, it is revealed as significantly different to the XACML-based security architecture.
III. MOTIVATING SCENARIO
A university (UoC) stores students' academic records, and allows students who can confirm their identity to access their record. Requests from students, to restrict access or provide access to academic records to specified third parties (e.g. potential employers) are an excellent example of the application of secure Web services. Figures 1 and 2 show the student's academic record, first as an informal document (something similar to the printed version), and secondly as it might be constructed as an XML document.
Academic records cannot be provided on demand by universities to employers without consent of the student for privacy reasons; on the other hand if employers obtain an academic record directly from a university it is assured of being authentic, complete and up-to-date (to the extent the university's own records are accurate). Managing the consent of the student, requests from employers, and provision of the academic records to employers is a task which requires careful Here is a scenario for the use of an electronic academic record:
• The student (JB), approaches a potential employer (eg the Nutty Bolt Co, (NBC)), claiming to have a Bachelor of Certification (BC) from UOC. This claim is supported by a reference to the academic record, at the URL citp://uoc.edu/acr/q2132435.
• If NBC expresses sufficient interest, JB informs the University that the academic record should be made available (accessible) to NBC (for a certain period of time). See Figure 3 .
• NBC accesses the academic record at UoC, providing their identity and taking advantage of the allowed access set up by JB at the previous step. A completely formal example similar to this is presented in Section 6 of [1] . The access software reports, in the course of retrieving the document, that it is genuine, that it is the academic record of this same JB, that the University is genuine (i.e. it is a university, accredited by the relevant government), and that JB has a Bachelor of Certification issued at suchand-such a date.
WLA permits NBC to access citp://uoc.edu.au/acadrec/q123 (W.1) 
A. Example of a Dynamically Added Service
Suppose, as a service providing an intermediate level of privacy, UoC offers to provide certified documents which include the name of the program together with the grade point average, minimum grade for any course, and maximum grade for any course taken in the program. It is possible to rigorously define all these quantities, relative to the well-defined structure of the academic record, by means of axioms expressed in the Predicate calculus. For brevity we consider only the minimum grade, and we assume that the following predicates are already fully defined: prog(x) -x is a study program, course(x) -x is a course, result(s,p,c,g) -student s received grade g for course c in program p. The function mingrade(s,p) (the worst grade recieved by student s in program p) can now be characterised by the axiom:
(An analogous axiom characterises the maxgrade function.)
This axiom is sufficient to completely define the function mingrade so it is not necessary to standardise the definition of this function, by adding it to an access control language standard. It is also not necessary to use an informal definition -published on the UoC Web site, for example -to capture the meaning of this new function, mingrade. This means that any protocol which needs to use this information can not only use this information in its reports, but also can base access control decisions on the rules which define this function.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE CRITERIA

Policy-sufficiency
Policy-sufficiency is a completeness condition -it is the requirement that participants may express any policy requirements that they see fit to choose. The XACMLbased security architecture makes no attempt to be complete in this sense. However, the RW-based architecture allows policies to be more broadly expressed. XACML is still adopted as the language in which access control is implemented, however a broader range of policies is allowed for in this architecture by the concept that XACML-based rules might provably ensure that these more general policies hold. See Section V for a more detailed discussion of policy-sufficiency.
Protocol-neutrality
Protocol neutrality is the condition that parties to a transaction can use protocols and message structures according to their own individual design and choices while remaining consistent with the security architecture, so long as these are logically equivalent to valid protocols in the architecture. See Section VI for a more detailed discussion of policy-neutrality.
Protocol-closure
Protocol closure -the condition that protocols can be combined together to create new services -is an explicit objective of the Web-services initiative. Examples which imply that a degree of completeness in this sense is achievable have been published.
Predicate-boundedness
The security architectures indicated in [15] , [16] , [6] , [13] make use of a large number of XML elements which are, in the terms of the present paper, predicates, which need to be standardised. It appears that this list must grow without limit as the security architecture develops to encompass more applications. See Section VII for a more detailed discussion of predicate-boundedness. In the following section we present an argument which suggests that if a language, such as RW, equivalent to first order logic is available for expressing policies, then any meaningul policy may be formulated. Hence the RW-based security architecture meets this criterion. In Section VII this criterion is shown to be necessary for an architecture if software developers can use it as the foundation for development of complex systems without having to rely on a succession of frustrating enhancements and modifications of the architecture.
Processing complexity
It has long been accepted that protocols for security and access control must have reasonable algorithmic complexity; this requirement must not be overlooked in the present context, in which other requirements are receiving the majority of our attention. Both architectures meet this criterion.
V. POLICY-SUFFICIENCY
A security architecture is policy-sufficient if, whenever it is possible to satisfy all the formally stated requirements of all the parties to a potential transaction there is a protocol in the architecture, and a protocol sequence, which brings about the desired transaction. Note that if the requirements of the parties to a transaction are inconsistent, this condition holds trivially, since conditions can't all be met.
For example, pursuing the example from Section III, if the student wishes the academic record to be made available to the Nutty Bolt Company, and the university is assured that this is the case, and also has complete confidence in the identities of the parties in which they are communication, then there should be a protocol, in the architecture, which will allow this to occur.
From this simple example it should be clear that policysufficiency is a very strong condition on a protocol architecture. It basically says that it should be able to everthing we could possibly ask of it. The challenge, therefore, is to show that this condition can be met. The feasibility of meeting this condition will be addressed in future work.
The example in Section III shows that certain conditions of interest require use of the full apparatus of the Predicate calculus (first-order logic) [10] , [12] [2, A.1] in order to be expressed. In particular, there are conditions which appear to require use of variables and quantifiers. Here is another example: "No student in the University of Certification failed more than 2 subjects in a semester during 2010." This statement appears to require a quantifier to be naturally expressed.
These examples show that universal quantifiers or existential quantifiers are required to express rules which may be useful. Since these are do not appear to be available in XACML, a security architecture based on the assumption that XACML is used to express all rules cannot be policy sufficient. The language RW, on the other hand, does include quantifiers, and so it is able to express these conditions.
The creators of RW point out that in any context where the range of possible values taken by a variable subject to a quantifier is finite, the quantifier is equivalent to another statement without quantifiers. However evaluating such statements would usually still be prohibitively inefficient, The more important observation is that there may be uses of statements with quantifiers which do not rely on their evaluation.
If we adopt and use XACML as the language of choice for security in all servers of a Web service network, and there are security requirements which can only be expressed using the full predicate calculus, then it is clear that our architecture is not policy sufficient.
A. Hilbert's thesis
Hilbert's thesis [2, p41] , is that: (a) when one is forced to make all one's mathematical (extralogical) assumptions explicit, the axioms of a theory can always be expressed in first-order logic (the Predicate calculus), and (b) the informal notion of provable in mathematics is made precise by the notion of provable in first order logic. Towards the nd of the 19th century and in the early part of the 20th, a number of alternative formulations of the concept of logical deduction were rigorously defined and compared: firstorder logic -also known as the Predicate calculus, Gentzen type systems, Hilbert-type systems. These can all be shown to be equivalent, lending weight to the Hilbert's thesis that there is really only one concept of mathematical theory and associated logical deductions.
Gödel's completeness theorem for first order logic is also interpreted as strong evidence for the fact that the mathematical notion of deducability has been fully captured in first order logic; for example, Barwise [2, p34] , writes:
The most important thing to remember, however, is that while there are many notions of proof, there is only one notion of provable for first order logic, as the Completeness theorem shows. This suggests the following hypothesis:
First order logic is sufficient to express any security constraints required for the good operation of web services. In particular, any formal language which is strictly weaker than the first order logic is not policy sufficient (in the sense defined in this paper), on account of the fact that we can propose rules which make use of the missing features of first order logic.
It is tempting to propose that quantifiers are only necessary when the domain of discussion is infinite, and in a finite domain the Propositional calculus has sufficient expressive power for all the necessary rules. However, if this is true at all, it is likely that the equivalent statements in the propositional calculus that are generated are much more difficult to use effectively that the original statements with quantifiers. Furthermore, in many situations where quantifiers are useful, in which the domain is finite, evaluating the truth of a statement with one or more quantifiers may be straightforward to evaluate (for example, by exhaustive enumeration of the domain).
Arguing from Hilbert's thesis, in order for a security architecture to be policy-sufficient, the language used for expressing its policy rules must be as expressive as first order logic.
VI. PROTOCOL-NEUTRALITY
Since the security requirements which emerge "out-of-thebox" of a security architecture might be rather onerous, and yet in many cases protocols exist which are considered by the participants to be quite adequate, when we strive to define an architecture for security it is important to consider how simple but effective mechanisms can be included as special cases. For this purpose we define protocol-neutrality.
In simple terms, protocol-neutrality is the condition that if a protocol is logically equivalent to a protocol which is valid in the architecture, then our security archicture is capable of adopting this protocol, or a minor variation of it.
A. Logical Equivalence of Protocols
The key requirement of a protocol ensuring security, in the broadest sense, is that the security constraints of all parties are validated, i.e. proof that these constraints are true at all times is provided and checked. Therefore, if we can find, by a deterministic procedure of linear complexity in the size of the protocol data and any required policy rule data, which constructs the required proofs for protocol A from those for protocol B, then if protocol B is valid in the architecture, protocol A should also be regarded as valid.
We therefore define logical equivalence of protocol's as the condition that the validations (proofs) which exist in one can be generated from the other, by a deterministic O(1) algorithm.
A protocol architecture is said to be protocol-neutral if any protocol exchange which is logically equivalent to a valid protocol exchange is also valid.
B. Mechanisms for Establishing Equivalence
The complexity of the procedures which might be required to establish logical equivalence between protocol sequences is unbounded. However, once a logical equivalence has been demonstrated (typically by careful analysis of the protocols by a protocol designer), the process of implementing the translation between the steps of one protocol and another is straightforward, by assumption. Hence the unboundedness of finding equivalences is of no concern to us.
C. Protocol Neutrality of XACML
Published security architectures are at an early stage of development. It is therefore unreasonable to expect them to generously adopt any valid protocol in the sense considered here as an accepted extension of their basic requirements. However, acceptance of such extensions is a natural development and at some point in the development of a practical security architecture it seems likely that such extensions will be contemplated. For example if a protocol exchange can be transformed to "standard" form by the application of a certain fixed XSLT template, the original protocol exchange must meet all our security needs, and it would be churlish to deny that it is also valid.
Since the RW-based security architecture also adopts XACML as the language in which access control algorithms are expressed, it is also not protocol-neutral.
VII. PREDICATE-BOUNDEDNESS
Predicate-boundedness is the requirement that as the number of services which make use of XACML, or another language for expressing security rules, grows, it is not necessary to further increase the basic symbols and language constructs (element types) in the language.
The reason this is important is that if this condition does not hold, a developer might have to wait till a predicate has been standardised before they can be sure that their software will work. Standardisation is far too slow to be inside a software development cycle. The difficulty of making use of a standard which is never quite complete is clear, and this criterion seeks to avoid this condition in a security architecture.
It appears therefore, paradoxically, that in attempting to maintain the simplicity of XACML, the inherently complex features (such as quantifiers) necessary to ensure that a fixed and finite number of basic primitives will be sufficient for all future development of security may have been sacrificed.
A. Defining the Meaning of Predicates
As the applications of a security architecture expand it is essential that the number of separate predicates in use also expands, either by introducing new element names within existing namespaces, or by introducing new namespaces and populating them with new names. The question of predicateboundedness is whether all or some of these new names need to become part of the standard. This question, in turn, turns on the question of whether these new names need to be in the standard in order to function meaningfully: in short -are the meanings of predicates determined by the agreed standard for their use.
Consider, for example, a security architecture which takes the extreme opposite approach: none of the predicates which are defined in the standard have any concrete meaning, in the domain of application of the web services whose security is being defined! This type of standard is confined to primitives which allow us to express logical relationships between the entities and the predicates which have a meaning in the domain.
When reading standards it is usually reassuring to see definitions of useful terms which have a clear meaning, and the one might even say that the greater the proportion of practical activity which falls within the scope of standard, the more reassured about the good sense and judgement of the standard's designers one is likely to be. But in the present case, this intuitive reassurance will actually be generated by evidence that the security architecture is not predicate bounded. In order to be predicate-bounded, the architecture must include a mechanism by means of which new predicates can be introduced and formally defined without being added to the standard; the existing symbols and predicates in the standard can be used to assign meaning to these new predicates.
In effect, the rules themselves need to be sufficiently rich in order that new predicates can be invested with all the meaning that they need in order to function in their role of defining and ensuring security for Web services.
B. Example (continued)
In the academic record example given above we saw how an axiom can be introduced which completely characterises the functions mingrade and maxgrade. Continuing, let us see how another agent can make use of the function maxgrade and its defining axiom. Suppose NBC wishes to make further inquiries concerning certain candidates who have applied for employment and provided only their minimal academic records. NBC are obliged, for reasons which do not concern us here, to appoint only students who have achieved at least HD in the course algorithms and data structures. Using the shorter academic records of students, NBC can eliminate from further consideration any students whose maximum grade is less than HD.
In order for this example to be demonstrate convincingly that without the use of variables and quantifiers, the language for policy rules will not be able to support indefinite expansion of the domain of application, without adding to the number of primitives which are included in the language definition, it appears to be necessary to provide considerably more details and to render this example in full (or at least much more full) detail, including full XML for all the relevant documents and transactions. The authors intend to undertake this work in another paper, which focusses on establishing detailed examples of this sort which can be used as test cases.
C. Predicate-boundedness of RW-based security architecture
New predicates may be introduced into the RW language without limit, and statements linking these new predicates to others may be used to give them meaning. In this respect the RW-based security architecture appears to be protocolbounded. However, in this architecture, it is expected that access control will still be expressed in the XACML language. This suggests that the RW-based security architecture is also not protocol-bounded. If new predicates are required in order to be able to express the policies needed for a particular web-service, until these predicates are established as welldefined and agreed, and therefore part of the XACML standard itself or an associated standardisation process, it will not be [7] , [9] , [4] , [8] , [14] Processing complexity meets meets [7] , [9] , [4] , [8] , [14] possible to prove that the protocol is valid (i.e. that the policy requirements are met).
VIII. PROTOCOL-CLOSURE AND PROCESSING-COMPLEXITY
A. Complexity
Protocol-closure and moderate (O(1)) algorithmic complexity have been explicit aims of the developers of the Web services security architectures associated with OASIS and XACML. A number of alternative algorithms for evaluating rules, all with low complexity, have been considered [7] . This requirement is therefore well established and fully respected in the literature on security architectures.
B. Closure
Similarly, it has been envisaged for some time now that protocols for Web services should form a family in which any reasonable combination can be formed and is likely to be useful. The details of how protocols may be combined have not been considered in work of which the authors are aware, however it is clear that this requirement is also fully respected in the literature on security architectures, and may be regarded as met by both the XACML-and RW-based security architectures.
IX. CONCLUSION
Three of the five criteria are implicitly referenced in the literature. In addition, arguments for the importance of all five criteria have been given above. The references, together with the evaluation of the two security architectures considered in this paper against the criteria, are shown in Table I .
Five criteria for web-services security architecture have been defined and explored. They have been used to evaluate two security architectures. Because these concepts address the pressing need for expressive power and flexibility in expressing security policies, this approach to evaluating protocol design is highly relevant to the protocols which now exist and which are currently being developed for Web services in the present and the immediate future.
